"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men... [no] controls on government would be necessary." — James Madison

"Mad" Anthony Wayne's 1782 Savannah Campaign

In the minds of many people, Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown in the fall of 1781 brought the American Revolution to a close. Regrettably, most historians have taken the same position.1 Yet the war in the South was not over. The British occupied Charleston and Savannah, and the Americans knew that physical possession and control of territory would play an important part in any peace negotiations. Consequently, Major General Nathanael Greene, Commander of the Southern Department, sent Brigadier General Anthony Wayne from South Carolina to Georgia to oust the British from Savannah.

It was a difficult assignment, because Wayne did notactually have a force capable of assaulting Savannah. Greenewarned him not to risk his small army in a major engagement where a defeat could destroy him. Rather, he was toclear the countryside and keep the British bottled up withinthe city. Wayne was also to endeavor to win over the heartsand minds of the Loyalists to encourage their desertion anddefection, and "soften the malignity [and] deadly resentments" between Patriots and the Loyalists.2 Furthermore, the American Indian allies of the British had to be controlled and encouraged not only to leave the area, but also to withdraw from the war entirely. Finally, the returning Patriotgovernment of Georgia had to be supported and protected.

Initially, Wayne's command would consist of 100Continental dragoons under Colonel Anthony White and a detachment of artillery. However, it is difficult to accurately reconstruct Wayne's forces, as they are not well documented and were transitory in nature. To illustrate: 300 South Carolina dragoons would join Wayne's army in late January. Yet the terms of their service expired on February 6, and thus they soon departed, only to be replaced later by other units of South Carolina dragoons. Wayne's army was also plagued by desertions.

Wayne ultimately had to utilize whatever manpowerwas available over the course of the campaign—including British deserters, "reclaimed citizens," and "out layers."The "reclaimed citizens" were Loyalists who, in an effort to regain their citizenship, agreed to fight for the Patriot cause. The "out layers" were quasi-bandits who plundered both Patriots and Loyalists. Wayne also had the services of the Georgia State Legion. He would write to Greene that this "extraordinary medley of troops" was all he had available, for "the State of Georgia not being able to furnishmore than a Company of Militia."3 He begged Greene for veteran infantry but, as always, Greene had none to spare.4

In contrast, Wayne estimated the enemy's strength at 900 regulars in Savannah, plus 50 dragoons and 250 infantry at a nearby farm owned by one Mrs.William Gibbons.5

January

Once his army was ferried across the Savannah River,Wayne established his campaign headquarters at Ebenezer, Georgia. On January 23, he wrote a letter to Greene, describing the immediate situation he faced.The area just north ofSavannah—from the Mulberry Grove and Gibbons plantations, north to Briar Creek and between the Ogeechee and Savannah Rivers—was a "perfect desert." No supplies or forage could be found, so Wayne had to be supplied fromAugusta and the South Carolina side of the Savannah. He was pleased that defectors were coming into his lines; aLoyalist officer and fifteen privates came in and enlisted for the duration of the war.6

On January 24, Wayne maneuvered the enemy fromthe Gibbons and Mulberry Grove plantations.The retreating forces burnt all the grain and forage behind them.The enemy also burnt forage on the islands in the SavannahRiver.7 Wayne reported his victory to Greene on January 26, and also criticized the Georgia Legislature, which had passed an ordinance confiscating all personal property of anyone who had joined the British, or were killed defending the Royal government.Wayne stated that the Assemblyhas "been rather vindictive, at a time when common policy,independent of any other considerations, ought to haveopened a wide door for the repenting sinner."8 Greene would later instruct Wayne to "hold out encouragement to the Tories to abandon the enemy's interest and though you cannot promise positively to pardon them you may promiseto do all in your power to procure it which will be nearly to the same amount."9

Wayne then detached Lieutenant Colonel WilliamMcCoy to intercept a band of Creek Indians who weremarching to Savannah. McCoy and his men deceived theCreeks by presenting themselves as Loyalists and thenled the band to Wayne's command. Twenty-six of theAmerican Indians were surrounded and disarmed without a fight.10 A week or so later, these same Creeks—while guarded by Lieutenant Colonel James Jackson's GeorgiaState Legion—escaped from Ebenezer. Colonel AnthonyWhite and his dragoons recaptured some of them, to whom Wayne attempted to explain his peaceable intentions.11

Similarly, Wayne detached Major John Habersham and alarge party of dragoons and mounted volunteers to prevent 300Choctaw Indians from reaching Savannah. Habersham wasordered to keep the men as hostages and send the women and Major Francis Moore—with Jackson's infantry, some militia, and dragoons under Colonel White—was to make a false attack on the northern defenses of Savannah itself. Barnwell was scheduled to initiate the operation at 1:40 a.m., and to land on the island at 2 a.m. However, he was discovered and fired upon by the enemy. To coverBarnwell's retreat and distract the enemy, Wayne orderedthe other units to immediately commence their part of theplan. Wayne gleefully noted that Savannah "was highlyilluminated at the expense of Sir James Wright." Foragefor the enemy cavalry would now be in short supply, andWayne asserted that if Barnwell had been successfuldestroying the forage on Hutchinson Island, the enemy's cavalry would have been "annihilated."17

Greene may have laughed upon reading Wayne's report, for he concluded his response thus:

"Your maneuver in the destruction of the enemies forage was capital. How strange to tell thatthe enemy are hounded with less than one thirdtheir numbers." 18

March

Helping Wayne's campaign was the fact that Georgia's Patriot Governor John Martin issued proclamationsdesigned to induce defections from the enemy ranks. Onesuch proclamation, written in German, aimed to producing Hessian desertions. A full pardon and protection—plus 200 acres of land, a cow, and two breeding swine—were offered to anyone who had joined the British orsought protection with them, on condition that they surrender to Wayne and agree to serve under him until theenemy either surrendered or left Georgia. Wayne "foundmeans to diffuse a number" of copies of the proclamationswithin Savannah.19

The proclamations produced immediate results.Thirtyeight mounted militia came out and enlisted. To stem the tide, the British "filled the swamps around their works withTories, Indians, and armed Negroes, to prevent desertions."Yet deserters kept coming through the lines—especiallyHessians. In fact, the Hessians were so prone to desertion that they were not trusted to stand guard except in the center of Savannah.20 Still, Wayne faced great difficulties. In March heinformed Greene that the British were doing all they couldto encourage the Creeks and other American Indians to join them in Savannah and wage war against the Patriots. Infact, a Patriot dragoon was killed and scalped by Choctaws on March 22 "under the eye and countenance of the Britishofficers and troops, who were out in force, but retreatedwith precipitation."21 Wayne's aide, Captain BenjaminFishbourne, wrote that the dragoon was

"killed and scalped in a most barbarous manner,under the eyes and Inspection of a British off icer, cut off his upper lip and nose, and cut his face, most barbarously, for which the Lieutenant Governor gave anentertainment, to those wretches a little while after. The few negroes whose humanity was affected, at thespectacle, buried the body."

Georgia's Royal Lieutenant Governor, John Graham,offered a reward for information on who buried the dragoon.22

Wayne informed Greene that, in retaliation for this act,"...we have since taken a Chickasaw chief,...we shall hold him, who, with the first British officer that falls into our hands will eventually be sacrificed to the manner of that brave unfortunate dragoon."23

Wayne was clearly outraged. He wrote: "Would youbelieve it possible, that a British Governor attendedby British officers, should be so lost to every feelingof humanity as to parade the streets of Savannah withthe scalp..."24

Greene's comment on this incident was succinct: "Governor Wright is worse than a savage."25

During the last week of March,White Fish—a chief of one of the Lower Creek towns—escaped from the Patriots.He made his way to a Creek encampment at the forks of the Canooche River, arriving two hours ahead of a pursuing force commanded by Major Moore. White Fish and the other Creeks immediately set out for the AltamahaRiver, returning to their own territory. Had Moore come upon them, he may have been defeated, as the Creeks numbered about 300 men. Before leaving their camp, the Creekskilled several Loyalist guides who they felt had betrayed them with false information that the road to Savannah was open.26 Greene's aide, William Pierce, would later write a friend that this incident was a significant break in AmericanIndian-British relations.27

April

Wayne responded to all this by ordering Moore to take up a position where he could strike White Fish's band should they attempt to go by water from the town of Frederica, on the west side of the Altamaha River, to Savannah. Moore's force of volunteers,"out layers," and "reclaimed citizens" wasto also intercept a band of Choctaws providing an escort for a shipment of ammunition and presents being sent by the British to the Upper Creek country. Meanwhile,Waynewould be "bullying the enemy at their lines" with Jackson's Legion and "a few Crackers and other species of Tories whohave lately surrendered themselves and joined our army."28

On April 7, reinforcements in the form of ColonelThomas Posey's Virginia Continentals came Wayne's way."I believe both officers and men are second to none in the American Army!" the general declared.29

Wayne's mood was tempered, though, on April 12.Major Francis Moore was killed while attacking a group of American Indians and Loyalists commanded by CaptainDonald Cameron at a crossing on the west side of theAltamaha River. Both sides claimed victory. One Patriot private was also killed in the attack, and two were wounded.Captains Patrick Carr and John Lyons of the Georgia StateLegion, with a "respectable force," pursued the enemy30

Around the same time as Moore's attack, five of Colonel Jackson's dragoons, and their guide—one Mr. Snider—found themselves surrounded by a force of thirty of theenemy. While the rest of their comrades wielded swords,one dragoon and Mr. Snider, firing one rifle and one pistol,killed Loyalist Major Philip Dill, and wounded two others, forcing the enemy to retreat from their sword-wielding comrades.31

The reports of combat close to the Savannah defensesmade Greene very uneasy. He wrote to Wayne, stating thathe did not want him taking up positions near the enemyunless he had a force large enough to lay siege to the city,which Wayne did not. Greene also made the sagely observed:

"if you expect to f ind desertion greater by [taking a position near the enemy] you will be mistaken for....you will f ind it far less. Drawing nearer the enemy will make them more vigilant, and besides which a soldier always feels his pride roused in the approach of an enemy. Men can bear almost any thing better than a charge of cowardice." 32

Wayne explained his actions to Greene:

"I have long adopted the opinion of those militarywriters, who lay it down as a maxim, that an off icer never ought to hazard a battle, where a defeatwould render his situation much worse than a retreat without it, (unless numbers and circumstances rendered success almost certain). A retreat in our situation would have the effect of a defeat, there is nothing but a howling desert in our rear, and the pass ofthe Savannah is rendered impracticable by an inundation [the Savannah River was high and over itsbanks making it impassable]. I have therefore constantly been in readiness to advance to meet the enemy,and leaving no object in my rear, I have always hadit in my choice, to give them battle, or to maneuverthem into their works, the latter we have more than once effected, but I never had an idea of taking a position within striking, but such a one as would tend to "notHIng requIres greater fortitude or more discipline than to stand firm in a night attack."

circumscribe [restrict] the enemy, without committingmyself, such a position is about six miles in our front,and if I am joined by a corps of riflemen under Col.Clarke [Elijah Clarke, of the Georgia Militia] agreeable to promise, I shall take it." 33

Wayne also informed Greene that

"in numbers the Enemy have the advantageof us...and I have received information, of a verylarge body of Savages, being on their march from the Indian Country, to cooperate, with their more savage employers." He concluded: "I have only to request you not to be too uneasy, on our account, for although committed, & far outnumbered. If caution, maneuver, or prowess will prevent disaster, or secure success,it will not be wanting." 34

This probably did not make Greene less uneasy.

May Around May 1, Captain Carr engaged in a skirmishwith Choctaws near Frederica, forcing the Choctaws toreturn to their boats they had taken from Savannah.Thesesame Choctaws attempted to cut through to their ownterritory by land on May 3, and were intercepted threemiles from Savannah by one Lieutenant Miller of Jackson's Legion and his force of twelve men. The Patriots waitedin ambush until the force of 70 Choctaws were within ten yards, then opened fire and followed with a bayonetcharge, thus routing the Choctaws, leaving five dead andmany wounded.35

About the same time, one Captain Bryce receivedinformation that a group of Loyalists were driving a herdof cattle to Savannah on the South Carolina side of the river. Operating on his own initiative and not waiting for support, Bryce pursued the "caitiffs" [definition: base,mean, despicable], ultimately capturing three Loyalistsand one hundred and seventy head of cattle four milesfrom Savannah. Wayne ordered that the area be clearedof cattle as part of his continuing efforts to deny suppliesto Savannah.36

On May 21, Wayne learned that the enemy had come out of Savannah in force. He immediately sent ColonelAnthony White's dragoons and Colonel Thomas Posey's Virginia Continental Infantry to the Gibbons plantation just upriver from Savannah. Late that afternoon, LieutenantColonel Jackson reported the enemy was in force at theHarris Bridge on the Ogeechee Road, seven miles fromSavannah. Another party was at the Ogeechee ferry, where Jackson intended to attack.37

The force at the ferry probably consisted of CaptainJames Ingram and 100 militia of the Volunteers of Augusta,sent by Colonel Thomas Brown to clear the way for the expected arrival of Chief Emistisiguo's band of Creek reinforcements. Jackson was forced to take defensive positions.Ingram then met up with Brown, who was on his way to the Ogeechee with over 300 men.38

The only way for Wayne to reach the midpoint of the Ogeechee Road between Savannah and the ferry, and to intercept Ingram and Brown, was to march through four miles of thick swampland. Furthermore, this march would have to be accomplished at night. Wayne recognized that such a maneuver would be dangerous, and that he would also be putting his forces "between the whole of the enemy's force in Georgia." Perhaps remembering his nighttime victory at the Battle of Stony Point in 1779 Wayne concluded that "the success of a nocturnal attack dependedmore upon prowess, than numbers" and that as his officers and men were experienced—as well as brave—he ordered the advance.39 Upon receipt of Wayne's letter, Greenereplied with cautioning advice:

"Night attacks are always attended with success,where they are unexpected. But you must be a little careful for a time how you attempt another lest the enemy prepare an ambush for you." 40

The vanguard of Wayne's forces arrived at the OgeecheeRoad, four miles Southwest of Savannah, at midnight. Theroad was a narrow causeway through the swamps. At thesame time the enemy appeared,coming down the road.Themain body of troops had not yet caught up with the vanguard,but Wayne ordered a bayonet charge. The general claimeda total defeat of the enemy forces as Colonel Posey's lightcompany under Captain Parker, and dragoons under CaptainHughes and Lieutenant Bayer, routed Brown and his force,which included Hessians, Loyalists, and Choctaws.41

The enemy dispersed into the swamps to escape, and the night and the terrain prevented the Patriots from pursuing effectively. Brown and most of his party made their way to Savannah.42 Yet Wayne had captured many prisoners, weapons, and horses, and his troops had been able to use "the American Sword and bayonet with such effect as to kill many and wound some." Patriot losses amounted to five privates killed and two wounded. Wayne's troopsthen returned to the Gibbons plantation to rest, and the following day paraded before Savannah in an unsuccessful attempt to entice the enemy out. Afterwards, the Patriots returned to Ebenezer.43

Perhaps feeling confident and flushed with victory,Waynesuggested to Greene: "Do let us dig the caitiffs out; it willgive an éclat [brilliance] to our arms, ..." Greene cooled thisscheme with a more realistic view: "...nothing would give megreater pleasure than to dig out those caitiffs at Savannah,but our force is really too small for the attempt."44

June

Colonel Elijah Clarke, who had recently joined Wayne's command, attacked and dispersed a band of500 American Indians attempting to join forces withthe British in Savannah. Clarke killed five men, and two guides were taken prisoner, "which he hanged afterobtaining what intelligence he could draw from them."Intelligence advised that 300 Coweta Creek Indians were still on the march to Savannah, and Wayne was determined to stop them.45

In the end, the last major engagement in Wayne's Savannah campaign took place at 3 a.m. on the nightof June 23-24, 1782, when Chief Emistisiguo surprised Wayne's main force encamped at the Gibbons plantation.The Patriot officers and men responded well, though, with Wayne leading a bayonet charge. Emistisiguo and several of his men were killed.46

After the battle, 12 American Indians were taken prisoner by Colonel Posey when they mistook Posey's men for their British allies. According to Posey, when Wayne discovered these American Indian prisoners, he ordered that they be executed.47

Pleased, Greene wrote: "I congratulate you on your success in the dispersion of the savages...Nothing requiresgreater fortitude or more discipline than to stand firm in a night attack."48

July

On July 1, a delegation of Savannah merchants came out to talk with Wayne under a flag of truce. The formal surrender took place on July 11. Lieutenant Colonel James Jackson was given the honor of accepting British General Alured Clarke's surrender. The regular troops shipped out to Charleston, while the Loyalist civilian refugees—consisting of about 4,000 black and 2,500 whites—waited for transportation to St. Augustine on Tybee Island, twelvemiles south of Savannah.49 Greene feared that the arrival of enemy troops in Charleston, who had withdrawn from Savannah before the surrender, would give the garrison in Charleston a military advantage over his forces.Thus, Greene ordered Wayneto return to Charleston as soon as the surrender was final. Wayne was reluctant to leave as Thomas Brown and his men were on Tybee Island and could, within a day, march to Savannah. After the evacuation of the Loyalists and their American Indian allies to St. Augustine, Florida, was well underway, Wayne finally left Georgia for Charleston on August 9.50

Thus ended Wayne's Savannah campaign. Interestingly enough, the general had unintentionally summarized the entire campaign back in February when he wrote to Greene:

"the duty we have performed in Georgia was muchmore diff icult than that of the Children of Israel, theyhad only to make brick without straw, but we had provision, forage and almost every article of war to provide without money; boats, bridges etc. to build without materials, except what we took from the stump[by force] and what is yet more diff icult than all, tomake Whigs of Tories, in opposition to every lot andhindrance thrown in our way by an [illegible] banditti, all which we have effected, and wrested this State (except the town of Savannah) out of the handsof the enemy with the help of a few [Continentals]." 51

Endnotes 1 It is with difficulty that one can locate reliable information about the 1782Savannah campaign. One is presented with generalities and broad statements of events in secondary sources. Many of these statements conflict regarding dates and some descriptions of events may be a mixture more than one event.Primary source materials are scarce and do not give us all the details that we would wish concerning actions, units involved, dates of actions or locations.The researcher should take care.

2 Greene to Wayne, January 9, 1792.The bulk of the Nathanael Greene-Anthony Wayne correspondence is in the William L. Clements Library of the Universityof Michigan. Many of these have been published in Selected Manuscripts from the Collections of the William L. Clements Library, edited by Howard H.Peckham, University of Chicago Press, 1974. The multi-volume The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, edited by Dennis M. Conrad, The University of North Carolina Press, provide the best single source for the correspondence involving the Savannah Campaign. Hereafter, citations will give only the nameof the correspondents and the date.

3 Patrick O'Kelley, Nothing But Blood and Slaughter, vol. 4. This valuable work is apparently inaccurate in its list of Patriot forces in 1782 Georgia. Work needs to be done to determine what units, with how many men, were available for service at any given time during the campaign.Wayne to Green, April 1, 1782.

4 Wayne to Greene, January 26, 1782.

5 Mrs.William Gibbons' plantation, known as "Sharon," was just north of Savannah,on the Savannah River.

6 Ebenezer, is located 25 miles north of Savannah, on the Savannah River. Itwould be Wayne'

s headquarters for most of the campaign. Wayne to Greene,January 23, 1782.

7 Wayne to Greene, January 26, 1782.

8 Wayne to Greene, January 26, 1782.

9 Greene to Wayne, February 4, 1782.

10 Wayne to Greene, February 1, 1782.

11 Wayne to Greene, February 11, 1782.

12 Wayne to Greene, February 11, 1782.

13 Wayne to Greene, February 11, 1782.

14 Edward J. Cashin, The King's Ranger, p. 151, cites letter of Habersham to Wayne February 8, 1782.

15 Greene to Wayne, February 9, 1782.

16 Wayne to Greene, February 22, 1782.

17 Wayne to Greene, February 28, 1782.

18 Greene to Wayne, March 6, 1782.

19 Wayne to Greene, March 11, 1782. Cashin, The King's Ranger, p. 148.

20 Wayne to Greene, March 11, 1782.

21 Wayne to Greene, March 25, 1782.

22 Fishbourne to Greene, March 25, 1782."Corroborating accounts of this incidenthave not been found," Papers of Nathanael Greene, vol. X, p. 540.

23 Wayne to Greene, March 25, 1782.

24 Wayne to Greene, March 25, 1782.

25 Greene to Wayne, April 6, 1782.

26 Wayne to Greene, April 1, 1782.

27 Pierce to St. George Tucker, April 6, 1782.

28 Wayne to Greene, April 1, 1782."Crackers" were southern frontiersmen.

29 Wayne to Greene, April 9, 1782.

30 Wayne to Greene, April 18, 1782.

31 Wayne to Greene, April 18, 1782.

32 Greene to Wayne, April 21, 1782.

33 Wayne to Greene, April 28, 1782.

34 Wayne to Greene, May 4, 1782.

35 Wayne to Greene, May 7, 1782.

36 Wayne to Greene, May 7, 1782.

37 Wayne to Greene, May 24, 1782.

38 Cashin, The King's Ranger, p. 151

39 Wayne to Greene, May 24, 1782.

40 Greene to Wayne, May 28, 1782.

41 Wayne to Greene, May 24, 1782.

42 Cashin, The King's Ranger, p. 151.

43 Wayne to Greene, May 24, 1782.

44 Wayne to Greene, May 27, 1782. Greene to Wayne, June 1, 1782.

45 Wayne to Greene, June 15, 1782.

46 Perhaps more than any other action in the campaign this skirmish is described at various geographic locations and in various levels of detail and conflicting detail. See Wayne to Greene, June 24, 1782; O'Kelley, Nothing But Blood and Slaughter, vol. IV pp. 76-77; William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, pp. 338-339; Henry Lee, edited by R.E. The American Revolution in the South, p. 556; Mark M. Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution,

p. 421; Cashin, The King's Ranger, p. 152; Hugh McCall, The History of Georgia,pp. 544-545; J.H. O'Donnell, "Alexander McGillivray" in Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 49, 1965, p. 181 cites,"The Virginia Gazette, or The American Advertiser," August 31, 1782, p. 2.

47 Lee, The American Revolution in the South, p. 559n. 48 Greene to Wayne, June 28, 1782. 49 Cashin, The King's Ranger, p. 153. 50 Cashin, The King's Ranger, p. 154. 51 Wayne to Greene, February 28, 1782.